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Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The
Selection of Defendants in World Trade
Organization Disputes
Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between the wealth and power of states and their ability
to participate fully within the World Trade Organization’s system of dispute resolution. Two
alternative hypotheses are considered. The power hypothesis predicts that politically weak
countries will refrain from ﬁling complaints against politically powerful states for fear of costly
retaliation. The capacity hypothesis predicts that low-income states will tend to complain
about behavior by high-income states because the latter offer a higher expected return. We
test these two hypotheses and ﬁnd considerable support for the capacity hypothesis and no
support for the power hypothesis. We conclude that poor states behave differently than their
rich counterparts because they lack the ﬁnancial, human, and institutional capital to partic-
ipate fully in the dispute resolution system.
1. INTRODUCTION
The 1995 birth of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was accom-
panied by a variety of procedural and substantive changes to the rules
ANDREW T. GUZMAN is Professor of Law at Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California at Berkeley. BETH A. SIMMONS is Professor of Government at Harvard Uni-
versity. We are grateful to Chad Bown, Marc Busch, Stephen Choi, Anne Joseph, Geoff
Manne, Petros Mavroidis, Niall Meagher, Joost Pauwelyn, Jay Smith, Steven Sugarman,
participants at the Conference on International Dispute Resolution at the University of
Chicago Law School, the Conference on International Law and International Relations at
Vanderbilt Law School, the Conference on World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement
and Developing Countries at the University of Wisconsin, the International Law West
Conference 2005 held at Whitier Law School, the Latin American and Caribbean Law and
Economics Association annual meetings and participants at faculty workshops at Boalt
Hall, Chicago-Kent Law School, Georgetown Law School, Lewis and Clark Law School,
the University of Illinois College of Law, and the University of Virginia LawSchool.Andrew
Sternlight and Alexander Noonan provided invaluable research assistance.558 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
of the international trading system.
1 The aspect of the WTO that has
received the most attention is the new Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU; World Trade Organization 1994). This unique mechanism for the
settlement of disputes established a formal and mandatory set of pro-
cedures intended to make the resolution of disputes a matter of law
rather than politics. Indeed, in the period immediately following the
establishment of the WTO, the DSU was celebrated as a rule-of-law
system that would replace the political and power-based system that had
previously existed (Lacarte-Muro and Gappah 2000).
2 It was not long,
however, before skeptics emerged, suggesting that the system remained
political and that the DSU was little more than a dressing up of the cold,
harsh, power politics that had always existed in the trading system.Now,
with 10 years of DSU practice behind us, we are just starting to under-
stand how the system has actually worked, and we are able to investigate
the extent to which it has replaced politics with law.
This paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of the role of
the DSU and the role of power within that system. We investigate the
litigation patterns of member states in an attempt not only to understand
whether richer and more powerful countries enjoy an advantage at the
DSU but also to shed light on the source of that advantage, if it exists.
An initial look at the data does not show any striking evidence that
poor countries are second-class members when it comes to dispute res-
olution. Indeed, quite the contrary: even at ﬁrst glance it is clear that
developing countries are active participants in the system.
3 They litigate
both as complainants and defendants, win cases at the same rate as
developed states, and settle cases at a rate comparable to developed
states.
There are two main reasons, however, why a more nuanced study
might reveal disadvantages facing poor countries at the DSU. First, they
may face capacity constraints that limit the number of cases they are
1. New agreements on agriculture, health and safety, services, intellectual property,
and more introduced a blizzard of new rules and obligations for members. The previous
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules remained but were clariﬁed or
interpreted through several “understandings” that accompanied the ﬁnal agreement. And
of course the WTO itself was a new institution with new rules and procedures.
2. “This system works to the advantage of all [WTO] Members, but it especially gives
security to the weaker Members....I n t h eW T O right perseveres over might” (Lacarte-
Muro and Gappah 2000).
3. Distinguishing developed and developing countries may not be the best way todivide
up the data, but it helps to get an initial sense of the data. In the empirical work that
follows, we rely on gross domestic product (GDP) rather than development status.DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 559
able to pursue. By capacity we mean the resources available to identify,
analyze, pursue, and litigate a dispute. Under this capacity hypothesis,
poor countries will ﬁle fewer cases because they lack the ﬁnancial, hu-
man, and institutional resources to do so. Second, states may face po-
litical hurdles to bringing cases. Despite the DSU’s attempt to take pol-
itics out of dispute resolution,
4 politically weak countries may be
deterred from ﬁling a dispute for fear of retaliation by the would-be
defendant.
5 Like the capacity hypothesis, the power hypothesis predicts
that countries will ﬁle fewer complaints if they are poor and politically
weak than if they are rich and politically powerful.
The problem with testing these hypotheses directly is that we have
no theoretically grounded baseline estimate of the number of cases a
country is expected to initiate at any given level of income, capacity, or
market power. This paper therefore adopts a more indirect approach.
Rather than examine the absolute number of cases ﬁled, we consider
the kinds of states named as defendants. Studying the selection of de-
fendants sheds light on the forces at work within the DSU. If the DSU
is a rule-of-law system in which power and wealth are irrelevant, we
would expect the income of the complainant to tell us nothing about
the wealth of the defendant in a case. But if power structures dispute
settlement processes, poorer countries should be expected to avoid lit-
igation against more powerful defendants for fear of retaliation. Finally,
if capacity constrains the use of dispute settlement procedures, weak
states will be able to pursue only those cases with big net payoffs and
will, therefore, go after the wealthiest defendants. By looking at the
choice of defendant, we are able to design a crisp test for the sources
of developing countries’ disadvantages—if any—in protecting their in-
terests through the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. We ﬁndstrong
evidence that developing countries are constrained by their capacity to
launch litigation and no evidence consistent with the power hypothesis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a very brief sketch
of the DSU, introduces some of the basic data on dispute resolution,
and reviews the small empirical literature relevant to our inquiry.Section
4. See the DSU (World Trade Organization 1994, art. 3.10): “[R]equests for concili-
ation and the use of the dispute settlement procedures should not be intended or considered
as contentious acts and . . . if a dispute arises, all Members will engage in these procedures
in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute. It is understood that complaints and
counter-complaints in regard to distinct matters should not be linked.”
5. There is empirical evidence that retaliation takes place. See Busch and Reinhardt
(2003) and Reinhardt (2000).560 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
3 presents the theoretical arguments that inform our expectations about
dispute initiation. Section 4 describes the regressions we run and the
predictions made by the capacity and power hypotheses, while Section
5 presents and discusses our results. Section 6 discusses a variety of
robustness checks that were carried out. Section 7 concludes.
2. LAW, POLITICS, AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
2.1. The Working of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
The DSU entered into force with the establishment of the WTO in 1995.
It introduced a number of changes to the practices that existed under
the pre-WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and
these changes are described in great detail in many other places (Cam-
eron and Campbell 1998; Guzman and Simmons 2002). We, therefore,
limit ourselves to a very brief overview sufﬁcient for present purposes.
The key feature of the DSU is that it is an exclusive and mandatory
system of dispute resolution. Any WTO member can complain about
the conduct of any other member through a formalized process that
includes consultations, a panel decision, an appeal, adoption, and im-
plementation. A defendant can neither block the case nor generate end-
less delays, and the report of the panel or (if there is an appeal) the
Appellate Body is formally adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body
shortly after its circulation.
6 The process is mandatory in the sense that
once a complainant ﬁles a request for consultations, the case proceeds
along a speciﬁed timeline to its conclusion and the defendant cannot
prevent it from doing so.
In addition to its mandatory nature, the DSU is, by its own terms,
exclusive. Article 23 of the DSU (World Trade Organization 1994) states
explicitly that states shall make use of the DSU to address the nulliﬁ-
cation and impairment of WTO obligations and shall not make deter-
minations about the WTO consistency of another state’s conduct except
through the DSU (see United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act
of 1974, WT/DS/152 [November 25, 1998]). Finally, the DSU seeks to
6. The report is adopted no later than 60 days after its circulation in the case of a
panel report and no later than 30 days after circulation for appellate reports. Strictly
speaking, a panel or appellate report is not automatically adopted because the dispute
settlement body can decide by consensus not to adopt it. Because the dispute settlement
body includes all WTO members, including both parties to the litigation,however,adoption
is all but certain.DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 561
Table 1. Dispute Settlement Understanding Participation by Income Level
High
Income
Upper
Middle
Income
Lower
Middle
Income
Low
Income Total
Cases as complainant 217
(61.7)
66
(18.8)
44
(12.5)
25
(7.1)
352
(100)
Cases as defendant 222
(63.1)
73
(20.7)
36
(10.2)
21
(6.0)
352
(100)
% of world trade, 1999
a 78.7 6.8 12.1 2.3 100
Note. Values in parentheses are percentages. Income categories are based on per capita
incomes and correspond to the World Bank (2005a) income categories: low income, $735
or less; lower middle income, $736–$2,935; upper middle income, $2,936–$9,075; and
high income, $9,076 or more.
a These data treat the European Community member states as a single country in cal-
culating shares of world trade. The year 1999 is chosen because it falls in the middle of
the data set.
remove politics from the dispute resolution process and discouragestates
from viewing a complaint as a hostile act.
7
2.2. Ten Years of Cases
How successful has this system been at removing power relations from
the settlement of trade disputes? Looking at the raw data from the
dispute settlement system, it is surprisingly difﬁcult to ﬁnd obvious evi-
dence of power or capacity constraints at work. Developing countries
as a group are active participants in the DSU system. Of all the cases
ﬁled, 38 percent have featured a developing country complainant.
8 Nor
are developing countries defendants any more often than they are com-
plainants. Table 1 shows the frequency with which countries are defen-
dants or complainants, with countries categorized by income (see Ap-
pendix A for a list of countries by income level). The income categories
are high income (HI), upper middle income (UMI), lower middle income
(LMI), and low income (LI).
9
Taking into account the share of world trade attributable to each
income category does not change the basic point. Developing countries
(all categories except the HI category) participate in the DSU system
7. See note 4.
8. Our data on cases ﬁled include all cases from the inception of the WTO through
2004. See Section 4.
9. The category “developed country” is identical to the high-income category, so 62
percent of cases feature a developed complainant and 38 percent feature a developing
complainant.562 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
Figure 1. Cases ﬁled by income category and year
more than we would expect on the basis of trade shares alone (Table 1,
third row). Even within the set of developing countries, there is no
systematic pattern of poorer countries being defendants more than they
are complainants or of poorer states litigating less than suggested by
their level of trade.
10 Since 1997, ﬁling rates of the wealthiest countries
have tended to converge toward the rates of the middle-income groups
(Figure 1).
At a minimum, these data make it clear that use of the DSU is not
the exclusive domain of the wealthiest complainants. Developing coun-
tries turn to this mechanism to protect their interests as well. We cannot
conclude from this, however, that the rule of law has erased the advan-
tages of the wealthy. As shown below, the evidence suggests that poor
countries have to pick their ﬁghts very carefully, and this is reﬂected in
the type of defendants they pursue.
10. One striking fact that is not evident from Table A1 is that only one least developed
country (Bangladesh), as deﬁned by the United Nations, has participated in the DSU system
as either a complainant or a defendant, and that country did so in only a single case. See
India—Anti-dumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh, WT/DS306/1 (January 28,
2004). Like the WTO, this paper uses the United Nations (2005) list of least developed
states.DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 563
2.3. Empirical Research
Although empirical work on the WTO’s dispute settlement system is at
an early stage, there are two prior papers of particular relevance to this
project. The best-known paper addressing the ability of poor countries
to participate in the DSU is Horn, Mavroidis, and Nordstro ¨m (1999;
see also Holmes, Rollo, and Young 2003). In that paper, the authors
investigate the initiation of WTO disputes and attempt to determine if
there is an institutional bias against participation by developing coun-
tries.
Horn, Mavroidis, and Nordstro ¨m (1999) assume that there exists a
particular functional relationship between the diversity of a state’s ex-
ports and the number of potential WTO cases it faces. They use this
assumption to predict the number of disputes a state should face and
compare this prediction with the actual number of cases ﬁled by the
country. Using data from the ﬁrst 4 years of the DSU, they ﬁnd that the
number of disputes brought by most members falls within a 95 percent
conﬁdence interval around their estimated number. Two aspects of the
study make it difﬁcult to evaluate the reliability of their ﬁndings. First,
for many countries the 95 percent conﬁdence interval predicting the
number of disputes includes zero. This means that the large number of
WTO members who have never been complainants behave as predicted,
but it is difﬁcult to know if this reﬂects the fact that diversity of trade
is really driving behavior or if some other factors discourage ﬁling by
these members.
11 Second, some of the largest users of the system fall
outside the relevant conﬁdence intervals of Horn, Mavroidis,andNords-
tro ¨m (1999), with the United States, Canada, and India pursuing more
complaints than predicted and Japan pursuing fewer.
12
Horn, Mavroidis, and Nordstro ¨m (1999) also investigate the possi-
bility that capacity constraints limit the ability of some states to ﬁle
cases. Using gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a proxy for
capacity, they ﬁnd that states with low GDP per capita bring fewer cases
than their model predicts but ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between
GDP per capita and the propensity to ﬁle a case. Finally, they produce
some evidence that states with fewer WTO representativestendtolitigate
11. For example, both the power and capacity hypotheses would be consistent with a
ﬁnding that many countries have never ﬁled a complaint.
12. These results are found in one of their two speciﬁcations,whichincludesathreshold
of $10 million in trade value, below which the cost of pursuing a case will deter ﬁling. In
their alternative speciﬁcation, without any minimum threshold, the United States, Canada,
and the European Community pursue more cases than predicted.564 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
less, but this result is signiﬁcant in only one of three speciﬁcations they
use, and the regressions do not control for other possible factors.
13
Horn, Mavroidis, and Nordstro ¨m (1999) is an important contribu-
tion to our understanding of the DSU, especially because it was com-
pleted so early in the institution’s history. Its main problem, and one
the authors recognize, is that we simply do not know what causes states
to ﬁle cases. Without good data on the set of potential cases, it is difﬁcult
to measure whether the number of cases a state has actually ﬁled is
larger or smaller than the number expected in a system without income
bias.
The other paper close to our own is Bown (2003). Bown evaluates
the factors that inﬂuence whether a state joins the dispute as a com-
plainant or third party. Although the true focus of Bown’s paper is on
other questions, his results suggest that capacity and power inﬂuence a
state’s decision to become a third party but not its decision to become
a complainant. In neither case, however, is he testing these hypotheses
as directly as we attempt to do.
14
3. THEORIES OF POWER, CAPACITY, AND DISPUTE INITIATION
We assume that states pursue litigation at the WTO when doing so offers
beneﬁts that outweigh the costs. We identify and isolate two main costs
associated with WTO disputes: political costs (relevant to the power
hypothesis) and resource costs (relevant to the capacity hypothesis). Po-
litical costs include any form of retaliation or sanction that a complain-
ant might suffer in response to its ﬁling a case. Resource costs include
the ﬁnancial, institutional, and human capital costs of a dispute. These
13. They look only to the number of cases ﬁled, so there is no way to know, on the
basis of their results, if the limited signs of capacity they ﬁnd are really driven by capacity
constraints or are a reﬂection of power imbalances. This is even true of their results for
the number of WTO representatives because this ﬁgure is strongly correlated with GDP
and GDP per capita. See Bown (2003).
14. Busch and Reinhardt (2003) present evidence that rich complainants are more
likely to extract concessions from defendants than are poor complainants but that the
complainant’s income has no impact on the likelihood of winning before a panel. They
interpret this as evidence that poor complainants are hampered by a lack of capacity, but
only in prelitigation negotiation. In contrast to Bown (2003), Busch and Reinhardt further
claim that a lack of market power with which to threaten a withdrawal of concessions
does not appear to play a role.DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 565
costs are more easily borne if the state has greater capacity. Thus, a state
ﬁles a case at the WTO if and only if
KPC 1 0,
where K represents the expected gains from ﬁling at the WTO, P rep-
resents the political costs of ﬁling, and C represents the resource costs
of a dispute.
In an attempt to get a better sense of the effect of income on DSU
use, we look at the mix of complaints ﬁled rather than their absolute
number. If income affects the behavior of complainants, we hypothesize
that it will also affect the defendants they select when ﬁling a complaint.
The expected beneﬁts, K, from a case consist primarily of improved
access to a country’s market.
15 Most typically, a complaint will demand
liberalization of a defendant’s market
16 or the termination of measures
that harm the complainant’s producers in some other way.
17 We expect
the size of these beneﬁts to depend in signiﬁcant part on the market size
of the defendant because, after controlling for existing trade ﬂows, lib-
eralizing a larger market offers a larger opportunity to domestic ex-
porters. Liberalization of the Canadian market, for example, is likely to
offer smaller beneﬁts to, say, the European Community (EC) than does
liberalization of the American market. Characteristics of the complain-
ant affect the cost side of the litigation decision, and we now turn to
consider these.
15. In some cases a complainant will seek some goal other than the opening of a
market. For example, some cases address an allegation of a WTO-inconsistent subsidy (for
example, see Australia—Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive
Leather, WT/DS/126 [May 8, 1998]). In such cases, one would still expect capacity-
constrained complainants to select high-GDP defendants, all else equal, because violative
conduct by potential defendants with large economies is more likely to have a large impact
on the complainant’s economy. Thus, an illegal subsidy by a large country is likely to have
a larger impact on sales by local producers than would a similar subsidy by a small country.
Similarly, disputes over compliance with the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) agreement (see Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS/199
[June 8, 2000]) are of greater importance to a complainant if the defendant has a large
market.
16. For example, a complainant may complain of illegal discrimination in the defen-
dant’s market, as was done in Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS/8 (June 29,
1995).
17. One example of this sort of case would be a complaint alleging an illegal subsidy,
such as that in United States—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC), WT/
DS/108 (November 28, 1997). Although it is rare, the complainant may also be protesting
measures that harm its consumers. See Japan—Measures Affecting the Purchase of Tele-
communications Equipment, WT/DS/15 (August 24, 1995).566 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
3.1. Complainant’s Capacity
Consider ﬁrst the role of a complainant’s capacity, by which we mean
the institutional, ﬁnancial, and human resources available to pursue a
case.
18 States that commit more people to trade issues and have more
qualiﬁed individuals working in the area, more mature and sophisticated
institutions to handle trade matters, and more ﬁnancial resources to
address trade disputes are higher capacity states.
We model capacity costs (C) as a function of the resource costs of
monitoring, investigation, negotiating, ﬁling, and litigating a case (Q)
and the resources available to the country (R), such that . For C p Q/R
simplicity, we assume Q to be constant across all disputes. The value of
R varies depending on the capacity of the complainant.
The result is that a country with less capacity faces a higher oppor-
tunity cost when it ﬁles a complaint (Sevilla 1998). When well-trained
and capable ofﬁcials investigate and pursue a complaint, they are taken
away from other work. The more limited the capacity of thegovernment,
the more difﬁcult it is to ﬁnd appropriate people to staff a case and to
make up for the work that these people would otherwise be doing. A
country with larger capacity will have more people with better training
dedicated to the pursuit of trade cases or to other closely related re-
sponsibilities. Such a country is also likely to have a much larger number
of people available to do the work that would otherwise have been done
by the individuals charged with pursuing a case. The ﬁnancial costs are
similarly easier to bear for a country with greater resources. However
difﬁcult it is for a developed country to pay the ﬁnancial costs of a case,
it is surely much harder for a poor, developing country to do so.
19
The shortage of resources may represent a relevant constraint at every
stage. A state with limited resources will invest less in monitoringtrading
rules abroad and investigating alleged violations by trading partners.
The growing complexity of trade law under the WTO makes these
18. Some states may have sufﬁcient capacity to pursue every case for which the beneﬁts
outweigh the costs. For our purposes, we need only assume that for many states this is
not the case. That is, we assume that a large number of states face a capacity constraint
that prevents them from pursuing as many cases as they otherwise would. This capacity
constraint may exist for any reason, including limited ﬁnancial resources, human capital,
institutional capital (for example, no effective mechanism for private parties to bring a
complaint forward), and so on.
19. The cost differences may be even greater because developing countries may need
to hire private counsel—generating a direct increase in costs—whereas a developed country
may be able to rely on in-house government lawyers.DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 567
capacity deﬁcits all the more constraining. The WTO agreements now
include not only the GATT but also an array of additional agreements
covering a wide range of issues and legal requirements, including new
areas such as services and intellectual property (Michalopoulos 1999).
20
Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the WTO grows with each passing
year, making it necessary to read numerous book-length panel and Ap-
pellate Body decisions in order to properly understand the legal context.
All of this complexity is compounded by the inevitable layerofprocedure
that goes with a formal system of dispute resolution.
21
All else equal, then, a country with limited capacity faces larger op-
portunity costs when it brings a case. Bearing these higher opportunity
costs requires larger expected payoffs. We would expect states with a
more limited capacity to focus their efforts on targets that offer the
greatest potential to increase their exports. At any given level of trade,
the demand for a product is more likely to be nearing saturation in a
smaller market than in a larger market. Hence our expectation:capacity-
constrained states are likely to pursue states with large markets, includ-
ing the United States and the EC. Developing countries are forced to
give up, this theory suggests, cases that involve smaller tangible payoffs.
Unlike their wealthier counterparts, poorer countries will be unable to
pursue cases that offer modest gains, long-term precedential value,
22 or
a “get tough” reputation in trade conﬂicts.
With different assumptions, of course, one can generate a capacity-
based theory under which developing countries avoid large markets.One
way to generate such a result is to assume that resource costs,Q,increase
with the GDP of the defendant. In that case, low-capacity states may
have a reason to avoid complaints targeting HI defendants. Although a
model along these lines can be generated, we do not expect it to be borne
out in the evidence. For capacity-constrained states to avoid HI defen-
dants, the costs of litigation must increase with the wealth of the de-
fendant faster than the expected beneﬁts of access to a larger market.
Furthermore, litigation carries with it certain ﬁxed costs (for example,
20. “[J]ust to follow the topics of the various WTO bodies and attend their meetings
requires a staff of at least 4–5 people, and the average is increasing . . . . [A] very large
number of developing countries did not meet [this standard]” (Michalopoulos 1999).
21. Concerns over capacity issues have been raised by a number of other commentators
(Michalopoulos 1999; Horn, Mavroidis, and Nordstro ¨m 1999; Bown 2003).
22. Strictly speaking, WTO decisions do not have precedential value, but as a matter
of practice later cases look to earlier cases for guidance in much the same way they would
if those cases represented binding precedent.568 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
Table 2. Infrequent Filers: Countries That Have Filed a
Single Case
Complainant Defendant
Antigua and Barbuda United States
Bangladesh India
China United States
Czech Republic Hungary
Hong Kong Turkey
Malaysia United States
Nicaragua Mexico
Norway United States
Singapore Malaysia
Sri Lanka Brazil
Uruguay European Community
Venezuela United States
identifying a violation, participating in initial negotiations, crafting the
basic arguments of the case). Filing against one wealthy defendant rather
than, say, two less wealthy defendants avoids the need to bear these
ﬁxed costs twice. Low-capacity states, therefore, will be deterred from
pursuing wealthy defendants only if the additional costs of those cases
are sufﬁciently large to overcome the advantage of having only one set
of ﬁxed costs. In addition to our intuition that capacity is unlikely to
work in this way, our empirical results are consistent with the capacity
hypothesis presented in the body of the paper and inconsistent with this
alternative theory.
There is some support for the capacity hypothesis in the raw data,
as shown in Table 2. Of the countries that have complained only once
at the WTO—and are therefore the most likely to face capacity issues—
all but two brought their case against the United States, the EC, or a
close neighbor of the complainant.
23 This is consistent with our capacity
model, which predicts that states bringing very few cases (that is, the
most capacity constrained among those that have participated as com-
plainants) will tend to pursue the largest targets and those with whom
they already have large amounts of trade.
Finally, one might think that wealthy defendants are less promising
23. The cases that do not appear at ﬁrst glance to be explained by an attempt to pursue
the beneﬁts of a large market or close economic ties are the complaints by Hong Kong
and Sri Lanka, respectively. One might categorize the Sri Lanka complaint as being con-
sistent with the capacity hypothesis inasmuch as Brazil represents one of the larger econ-
omies in the WTO, although it is admittedly not in the same league as the EC or United
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targets because they are more likely to win the case. That is, wealthy
defendants are able to afford the best possible defense and may, as a
result, win cases that a poorer defendant would lose. Once again, this
is theoretically possible, but we are skeptical.
24 The vast majority of all
cases decided by a panel yield a victory for the complainant. Both de-
veloped and developing country complainants win approximately 90
percent of these cases, and developed and developing countries settle
their cases at about the same rates. In any case, if wealthy defendants
are unattractive because they are better litigators, we should see empir-
ical results inconsistent with the predictions of the capacity hypothesis.
3.2. Power
An alternative determinant of ﬁling patterns ﬂows from the power de-
fendants have to impose costs on complainants. The defendant may
consider use of the DSU to be a hostile act and may retaliate through
trade, foreign aid, or other areas of international relations. We hypoth-
esize that the political costs of ﬁling, P, are a function of the difference
in political power between the complainant and the defendant, meaning
that P is a function of the relative power of the parties:
P p P(p p), cd
where , , represents the political power of country i, measured pi p {c, d} i
in absolute terms.
The greater the power differential, the greater the ability of the more
powerful state to impose costs on the less powerful state withoutconcern
for counterretaliation. The notion then is that less powerful states are
reluctant to challenge more powerful states for fear of retaliation or
retribution. The risk of retaliation exists in part because a defendant
can react to a complaint in many ways that lie outside the WTO process.
For example, foreign aid could be reduced, cooperation in other areas
could be frustrated, and the general tenor of interstate relations could
be harmed. Even within the trading system there could be retaliation.
Legal measures could be put in place that harm the interests of the
complaining party, resolution of other trade disagreements may be frus-
24. There is empirical evidence that the complainant’s income has no effect on the
probability that it will win a case that leads to a panel ruling (Busch and Reinhardt 2003).570 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
trated, or the defendant can retaliate with a suit of its own.
25 For ex-
ample, Reinhardt (2000) concludes that a complaint increases the prob-
ability of a subsequent case being ﬁled by the defendant against the
complainant by up to 55 times. Whatever the form of the retaliation,
we expect it to be most pronounced when the defendant ismorepowerful
than the complainant.
26
To illustrate the power hypothesis, imagine that the EC has put in
place an illegal safeguard measure. Two WTO members are affected by
this violation: the United States and Brazil. Removing the safeguard
would generate beneﬁts to both potential complainants.
27 Although the
United States may face some political cost if it ﬁles a complaint, the fact
that it is politically powerful gives it a greater ability to resist retaliation
or to threaten harm to the EC should the latter retaliate. Brazil, on the
other hand, is politically weaker than the EC and could face more severe
consequences if it ﬁles a complaint. All else equal, we would expect the
United States to be more likely than Brazil to ﬁle a complaint.
Now imagine the same situation, but change the potential defendant
from the EC to Argentina and assume for simplicity that Argentina is
comparable to Brazil in terms of political power. The United States re-
mains more powerful than Brazil, but does it face a dramatically lower
political cost than Brazil if it ﬁles? What if the defendant were much
weaker than Brazil—say, Belize. Is it still true that Brazil faces political
costs of ﬁling that are signiﬁcantly higher than those of the UnitedStates?
If the political costs change linearly with the difference in political
power, including when the complainant is more powerful than the de-
fendant, there will be no obvious difference in the mix of cases ﬁled
based on the power of the complainant. More powerful states will have
lower costs with respect to every potential defendant, causing them to
ﬁle more cases. Because the more powerful state has a low cost of ﬁling
25. An example of a retaliatory ﬁling is Brazil’s requests for consultation in Canada—
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS/46 (June 21, 1996), which
complained about Canadian subsidies to its regional aircraft industry. These complaints
followed a complaint by Canada, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/
DS/70 and 71 (March 14, 1997), made 9 months earlier, alleging illegal subsidization of
the Brazilian regional aircraft industry.
26. Hudec (2002, p. 81) points out a further problem for weak countries pursuing
strong defendants. “According to conventional wisdom, it is a waste of time and money
for developing countries to invoke the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures against in-
dustrial countries....[ R ]etaliation will harmthe developing countryimposingitfarmore
than it will harm the industrial country it is supposed to punish.”
27. For simplicity, we assume that the beneﬁts are the same for both.DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 571
relative to the less powerful state, it is more likely to ﬁle in every case,
regardless of the identity of the potential defendant. So the more pow-
erful state is more likely to ﬁle against Belize, just as it is more likely
to ﬁle against the EC. We would, therefore, observe more cases ﬁled by
the powerful state, but the power hypothesis would not predict a dif-
ferent mix of cases without additional assumptions.
This point has important implications for the results of this paper.
Although our results fail to support the power hypothesis, we cannot
rule out the possibility that power plays an important role indetermining
the number of cases ﬁled. It may be that a more powerful country, all
else equal, ﬁles more cases than a less powerful one. To be consistent
with our results, however, the impact of power on litigation must affect
only the number of cases ﬁled and not the selection of defendants. What
is clear from our results is that there is no evidence to support the view
that poor or weak countries are especially reluctant to ﬁle against rich
or powerful countries for fear of the political consequences.
Our prior is that political power has a more pronounced effect when
the complainant is weak relative to the defendant and has less impact
when the complainant is at least as powerful as the defendant. We expect
that states are reluctant to ﬁle against countries more powerful than
themselves but enjoy only modest cost savings when they ﬁle against a
less powerful country rather than one whose power is equal to their
own. To capture this intuitively satisfying notion, we consider a model
in which the impact of power differentials is asymmetric. Speciﬁcally,
we model the political costs P such that , where P represents
(pcpd) P p 1/a
the political costs borne by the complainant when it ﬁles a request for
consultation, pc represents a measure of the political power of the com-
plainant, and pd represents the political power of the defendant. Figure
2 illustrates the relationship we envision between power and the political
costs of ﬁling.
The notion here is that differences in political power matter most
when the complainant is weak relative to the defendant because that is
when there is the greatest potential for costly retaliation. As the differ-
ences in political power shrink, the political costs of bringing a case fall,
but do so at a decreasing rate as the difference in power shrinks and as
the complainant’s power grows larger than the defendant’s.
The two competing hypotheses, then, make different predictions
about the relationship between the power and income of defendants and
complainants. These are summarized as follows:572 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
Figure 2. Political cost of ﬁling
The Capacity Hypothesis. As a country’s income falls, a larger per-
centage of its complaints will be directed at HI defendants.
The Power Hypothesis. As a country’s political power falls, a larger
percentage of its complaints will be directed at states with little political
power.
To illustrate the working of each hypothesis, imagine the behavior
of a state that faces a list of potential defendants, as shown in Tables 3
and 4. The columns list the cases that the state will ﬁle, depending on
the income level of the potential complainant.
All else equal, the capacity hypothesis suggests that a capacity-
constrained state will be able to pursue only a limited number of cases.
The state must prioritize the list of potential defendants and will tend
to pursue larger markets rather than smaller markets. Thus, a low-
capacity complainant may pursue only one case, and that case will be
against a defendant with a large market. If the complainant had a slightly
higher but still below-average level of capacity, it would pursue some
additional cases, prioritizing the defendants with the largest markets. If
the complainant had above-average capacity levels, it would pursue still
more states, again preferring to complain against large-market states.
Finally, a high-capacity state might be able to ﬁle against all potential
defendants. This behavior is illustrated in Table 3.
The power hypothesis suggests that a politically weak state facesDEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 573
Table 3. Capacity Hypothesis Illustrated
Potential Defendant Low
Below
Average
Above
Average High
United States United States United States United States United States
Japan Japan Japan Japan
Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil
South Africa South Africa South Africa
Turkey Turkey Turkey
Egypt Egypt
Costa Rica Costa Rica
Pakistan Pakistan
higher costs when it challenges a politically powerful state. So a low-
power complainant will be reluctant to ﬁle against any state with power
greater than its own (or, more accurately, will require greater beneﬁts
as the power of the defendant increases). It will, therefore, tend to target
the weakest of the potential defendants. If the complainant has slightly
more power, it will target some larger number of defendants but will
still select weaker rather than stronger states. If the complainant has still
more power, the list of defendants grows and, ﬁnally, a high-power state
might pursue every potential defendant. This behavior is illustrated in
Table 4.
4. EMPIRICAL TESTS
We evaluate these claims about power and capacity using ordinary least
squares regressions with robust standard errors. Because of the possi-
bility that observations within country pairs are not independent, we
calculate standard errors on the basis of country-pair clusters.
Our data set consists of all “requests for consultations” ﬁled at the
WTO since its inception in 1995 through the end of 2004. These data
consist of 324 distinct requests for consultation, which include 352
complainant-defendant pairs because some complaintsfeaturemorethan
one complainant. As is done in most work on WTO dispute settlement,
when a complaint features multiple complainants, we treat the data as
if each complainant has ﬁled a separate case (Busch and Reinhardt 2003;
Horn, Mavroidis, and Nordstro ¨m 1999). This is done because each com-
plainant must decide independently whether it wishes to participate in
the case and each complainant may settle with the defendant bilaterally.574 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
Table 4. Power Hypothesis Illustrated
Potential Defendant Low
Below
Average
Above
Average High
United States United States
Japan Japan
Brazil Brazil Brazil
South Africa South Africa South Africa
Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey
Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt
Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica
Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan
4.1. The Dependent Variable
The main dependent variable of interest is the log of the defendant’s
GDP. This serves as a measure of both the political power and themarket
size of the defendant (see Appendix B for details of the data).
4.2. Key Explanatory Variables: Capacity and Power
Our primary empirical challenge is to develop reasonable proxies for
power and capacity. The key variable in this regard is the log of the
complainant’s GDP. The size of the economy plausibly measures both
the power and capacity of a complainant to defend its trade interests at
the WTO, and our two hypotheses have opposingpredictions.Thepower
hypothesis views the complainant’s GDP as an indicator of power and
expects a positive coefﬁcient: the larger the complainant, the more it is
willing to take on powerful defendants; the smaller the complainant, the
more it will be deterred from doing so for fear of retaliation. Gross
domestic product also reﬂects aspects of a country’s capacity to pursue
disputes at the DSU. Larger economies have more human and technical
resources with which to pursue a case. If capacity constraints predom-
inate, we should see a signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient for GDP as smaller
states marshal their resources and pursue primarily large defendants. In
this way, GDP provides a crisp test of the two hypotheses considered
here.
The log of the complainant’s GDP per capita is an alternativemeasure
of both capacity and power. As a measure of power it suffers from the
fact that high per capita GDP may be present in a small country with
modest political power (for example, New Zealand), but we expect it
nevertheless to be positively correlated with power. It is also a useful
measure of capacity, in particular as a proxy for the human capital ofDEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 575
trade ofﬁcials. Ultimately we view GDP per capita as a less useful proxy
for capacity or power than a country’s total GDP. We expect both power
and capacity to be correlated more closely with absolute measures of
the state’s resources and inﬂuence rather than its per capita wealth.
Nevertheless, we use GDP per capita to test the robustness of our GDP
results. A positive coefﬁcient supports the power hypothesis, while a
negative coefﬁcient provides evidence in favor of the capacityhypothesis.
We include several other variables that serve as proxies for capacity
and/or power. The ﬁrst of these is the number of WTO representatives
a state has in Geneva. The motivation for this variable is clear. States
that have more WTO representatives are devoting more resources (hu-
man and ﬁnancial) to the handling of WTO issues in Geneva and, one
assumes, devoting greater resources within their own countries to these
issues. The number of WTO representatives is a fairly direct indicator
of the resources a country is able and willing to bring to bear on WTO
cases. The variable also has the merit of having been used in previous
work on the same subject (Bown 2003; Horn,Mavroidis,andNordstro ¨m
1999; Michalopoulos 1999).
Of course, a country’s ability to pursue its trade interestsisnotlimited
to its staff in Geneva. Especially at the monitoring stage, countries with
more extensive ofﬁcial economic contacts will be in a better position to
assess trade policies that run counter to WTO rules and national inter-
ests. We capture this notion with data on the number of embassies a
country maintains overseas. In part, this measures the ability of the
government to ﬁeld skilled diplomats (including economic ofﬁcers) to
gather information on which WTO complaints could plausibly be
based.
28 If the number of embassies reﬂects capacity in this way, the
capacity hypothesis predicts that it should have a negative association
with defendants’ GDP. If, however, embassy networks are just another
measure of a country’s global interests and hence its power, the coefﬁ-
cient is expected to be positive.
Our next capacity measure more directly taps the ﬁnancial capacity
of the complainant government. A government pinched for resources is
likely to be highly constrained in its programmatic efforts to defend its
trade interests. Governments with limited ﬁnancial resources are likely
to have scant human and technical resources to devote to WTO issues.
28. Both the WTO representatives and the embassy variables are ﬁxed throughout the
period for each country. Although one would ideally like these proxies to adjust each year,
we have no reason to think that there have been dramatic changes in either variable over
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We use the log of the complainant’s nonmilitary government expendi-
ture, calculated annually, to test this kind of capacity constraint. Again,
the capacity argument anticipates a negative coefﬁcient.
Another measure of capacity looks to the quality of a country’s bu-
reaucracy. The bureaucratic quality measure is drawn from the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide (PRS Services 2005; for a full discussion
of the conceptualization and measurement of the bureaucratic quality
measure, see Knack and Keefer 1995). This indicator measurestheextent
to which a country’s bureaucracy is capable of carrying out a range of
administrative tasks on a scale of 1 to 6. The data are collected through
surveys of individuals doing business internationally and reﬂect their
perceptions of the quality of national bureaucracies. This measure has
three weaknesses for our purposes. First, unlike the measure of Geneva
staff, this measure is not speciﬁc to trade personnel. Second, it is less
objective than the indicators of capacity that relate to Geneva staffs and
embassy ofﬁces. Furthermore, unlike the three measures of capacity dis-
cussed above and like GDP per capita, bureaucratic quality is not af-
fected by country size. Nonetheless, a subjective indicator of the general
quality of a country’s public bureaucracy may be a useful supplement
to the more trade-oriented and objective measures discussed above.
Each of these capacity indicators is correlated to some degree, but
they each tap into distinct aspects of the constraints developingcountries
may face. The number of WTO representatives is a direct indicator of
staff directly available to pursue WTO issues. The number of embassies
is a broader indicator of the informational and diplomatic constraints
a government faces. Domestic expenditures reﬂect the ﬁnancialresources
at the government’s disposal and perhaps most directly the notion of
opportunity costs implicit in a tight budget constraint.Bureaucraticqual-
ity measures the functioning of government and perhaps the human
capital of government ofﬁcials. Because these are distinct but highly
correlated, we chose to test these indicators sequentially rather than
simultaneously.
Because none of these measures is a perfect measure of capacity to
litigate, we include a behavioral indicator as well. Using a dummy var-
iable, we control for a country’s past participation in the DSU process.
29
Participation itself indicates at least a minimal ability to take legal action
or to defend against a claim. Moreover, participation—whether as a
29. To have participated in the past, it is sufﬁcient to have been either a complainant
or defendant in a request for consultations.DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 577
Table 5. Prediction of the Hypotheses
Complainant Variable
Predicted Effect
Power Capacity
Gross domestic product 
Gross domestic product per capita 
Number of World Trade Organization representatives 
Number of embassies 
Nonmilitary expenditures 
Military expenditures 
Bureaucratic quality 
Past participation 
defendant or a complainant—contributes to capacity by developing ex-
periential human and institutional capital. Those who have participated
in DSU proceedings in the past are likely to have learned somethingfrom
that experience, making it easier to pursue cases in the future. This “past
participation” dummy takes on the value of one if the complainant has
participated in DSU proceedings in the past as either a defendant or a
complainant. The capacity argument would be supported by a negative
correlation with the defendant’s GDP as more experienced governments
go after a broader range of defendants.
Some of these variables are plausible proxies for power in addition
to capacity (GDP, for example). Nevertheless, we include in our regres-
sions the log of the military expenditures of the complainant as a proxy
for that state’s power. Although military expenditures do not translate
perfectly into political power in international relations, we certainly ex-
pect the two to be related. Table 5 summarizes the predictions each
hypothesis makes with respect to these indicators.
4.3. Controls
In addition to the variables discussed above, we include a number of
control variables. These control variables can be grouped into several
clusters. The ﬁrst cluster controls for the dyadicnatureoftherelationship
between the complainant and defendant. There is empirical evidence,
for example, suggesting that DSU participation is affected by the value
of the complainant’s imports from the defendant (Bown 2004), so we
include the log of this value in our regressions. The relationshipbetween
imports and DSU activity is explained with a very particular sort of
power argument. The notion is that at the end of the day, the com-
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trade sanctions (to “suspend concessions,” in WTO parlance). The more
the complainant imports from the defendant, the greater the potential
for sanctions.
30 Thus, the ability of the complainant to impose harm on
the defendant through a withdrawal of concessions in the event of non-
compliance with a panel or Appellate Body ruling inﬂuences the decision
to pursue a case at the WTO (Bown 2003). Although the power hy-
pothesis would predict a negative coefﬁcient on this variable,
31 we treat
it as a control variable rather than a variable that yields information
about the hypotheses that interest us. We believe the complainant’s im-
ports from the defendant are better viewed as a control because the size
of the defendant is likely to affect this variable for reasons unrelated to
either the capacity or power hypotheses. Simply put, country A may
import a lot from country B because country B is large. This correlation
between the defendant’s size and the value of its exports will tend to
produce a positive coefﬁcient (and, indeed, that is what we observe in
our regressions). This should not be taken to contradict the power hy-
pothesis as it probably just reﬂects the relationship between the defen-
dant’s size and its exports.
Bown (2003) has also found that the complainant’s exports affect
dispute initiation. To address this concern, we include the complainant’s
exports to the defendant divided by the complainant’s total exports as
a control variable. The notion here is that a state is more likely to pursue
a WTO complaint if the defendant is an important trading partner. If,
for example, the majority of Canada’s trade is with the United States,
Canada is much more likely to pursue a case against the United States
than against its other trading partners.
32
We include a dummy that takes on the value of one if the defendant
has ﬁled against the complainant within the last year. This is done to
30. The sanctions permitted under the DSU are limited to an amount “equivalent to
the level of the nulliﬁcation or impairment” (World Trade Organization 1994, art. 22[4]).
This might suggest that the threat of sanctions is maximized as long as the sanctions that
can be imposed on the complainant’s imports from the defendant are larger than the value
of the nulliﬁcation or impairment.
31. The power hypothesis predicts a negative coefﬁcientbecausetheabilitytowithdraw
concessions will be more valuable when it can be done without fear of retaliation (that is,
when the defendant is relatively weak). As the value of the complainant’s imports from
the defendant increases, a complainant has more incentive to seek a defendant against
whom this can serve as a credible threat, which means weaker defendants.
32. An alternative speciﬁcation would consider the dollar value of bilateral exports
rather than the share of bilateral exports in total exports. Running the same regressions
with this alternative speciﬁcation did not affect the results as reported in our robustness
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account for the possibility that some ﬁlings are retaliatory in nature, as
suggested by Reinhardt (2000). If, in fact, some ﬁlings are retaliatory,
the power hypothesis predicts that retaliation is less costly when the
target is a relatively weak country than when it is a relatively strong
one. Thus, the power hypothesis suggests that the retaliation variable
should have a negative coefﬁcient—retaliation should be more common
when the defendant (against which the complainant is retaliating) is
weak. That said, we do not place too much importance on this particular
prediction because the threat of retaliationmay affectthe initiallitigation
decision of states. That is, a weak country may hesitate to complain
against a powerful country because it fears a retaliatory complaint will
be ﬁled. If this pattern is common, it could deter enough ﬁlings by weak
states to prevent the ﬁnding of a negative coefﬁcient.
As a ﬁnal dyadic indicator, we include a dummy that takes on the
value of one if the parties to a dispute have a preferential trading agree-
ment (PTA) in place to reﬂect the fact that states in PTAs may have
alternative, non-WTO mechanisms for resolving disputes.
The second cluster of control variables attempts to take into consid-
eration the nature of the case itself. For example, a truly dyadic dispute
could differ systematically from those involving multiplecomplainants.
33
Being one of a group of complainants may insulate the state from po-
litical pressure and may reduce the demands on its human and ﬁnancial
resources. For these reasons, we include a dummy variable that takes
on the value of one when the complainant in the dyad is one of several
complainants in the case before the WTO.
34 Similarly, we include a
dummy for what we label “bandwagon” cases—those that feature the
same defendant and same issue as a previous case, but a different com-
plainant. The idea here is that the second complainant to ﬁle on the
same issue against the same defendant may enjoy some political cover
as a result of being the second to ﬁle.
35
33. Our data set includes seven requests for consultation in which there are multiple
complainants, generating a total of 36 observations.
34. Thus, for example, in Hungary—Export Subsidies in Respect of Agricultural Prod-
ucts, WT/DS/35 (April 2, 1996), we include a separate observation for each of the com-
plainants (Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Thailand, United States), but the
dummy variable for multiple complainants is equal to one in each observation.
35. For example, European Communities—Trade Description of Scallops, WT/DS/12
(July 25, 1995) and WT/DS/14 (July 31, 1995), were brought by Chile and Peru, respec-
tively. The relevant dummy is set to one for the later complaint, brought by Peru. We
include in the deﬁnition multiple cases ﬁled on the same day and against the same defendant
on the same issue. In those cases, all the dyads are labeled bandwagon cases andtherelevant580 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
We include a dummy that takes on the value of one if the case in
question is a reﬁled case, by which we mean there has been an earlier
request for consultations between the same parties on the same issues
(or perhaps a subset thereof) that was not resolved.
36 We assign the value
of one to the dummy in the reﬁled case and not in the original case
because it is only in the latter case that one would expect changes in
the consequences of a complaint. A reﬁling may put fewer pressures on
a state’s capacity constraint, and it may also feature a different political
dynamic because it is, in some sense, a continuation of an earlierdispute.
Cases may also be inﬂuenced by the nature of the good or service
under dispute. We include additional dummies to control for the par-
ticular WTO Agreement or agreements that have sparked the dispute.
In our main regressions we include dummies for the Agriculture Agree-
ment, the Anti-dumping Agreement, the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS), the GATT, the Sanitary and Phylosanitary Measures
(SPS) Agreement, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, and the WTO Agreement. These agreements
were chosen because the relative economic size of the parties seemed
relevant to the existence of a dispute (for example, one might expect
TRIPS-related disputes to frequently feature a wealthy complainant and
a poor defendant), they accounted for a large number of disputes (for
example, the GATT was at issue in 263 of our disputes and the Anti-
dumping Agreement was at issue in 69), or because they werestatistically
signiﬁcant in some of our robustness check regressions.
A third set of controls relates to qualities of the individual complain-
ants and defendants that could plausibly affect the decision to initiate
dummy variable is assigned the value of one in each case. For instance, Japan—Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS/10 and WT/DS11, were brought by Canada and the United
States, respectively, on July 17, 1995.
36. For example, Korea—Measures Concerning the Testing and Inspection of Agri-
cultural Products, WT/DS/3 (April 6, 1995), was subsequently reﬁlled as WT/DS/41 (May
31, 1996). The dummy variable for the earlier case (WT/DS/3) is set equal to zero, and
the dummy for the later case is set equal to one. This dummy also takes on a value of one
when the later case is a follow-up to the former and represents an effort to generate
compliance. For example, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS/158 (January 25, 1999), is a follow-up to the earlier
Bananas cases (WT/DS/16, WT/DS/27), and the dummy is set to one for each of the dyads
in the latter case. The precise deﬁnition of a reﬁled case is, of course, subject to judgments
about what counts as the same issue. In an attempt to make this classiﬁcation as objective
as possible, we looked ﬁrst to the subject matter of the case to see if it was the same as
that in an earlier case, and we then looked to the request for consultations to determine
if it reﬂected the same dispute as the earlier case.DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 581
a dispute. We account for each country’s general trade openness by
including the log of the total trade of both the complainant and defen-
dant divided by its GDP. There are no clear predictions regarding the
coefﬁcients on these variables from either the power or capacity hy-
potheses, but we include them as controls because the degree of openness
in an economy is plausibly relevant to the frequency with which it ﬁles
a complaint. And to ensure that our results are not driven by the two
giants of the WTO—the United States and the EC—we include dummies
for when each of these countries is the defendant and for when they
litigate against one another.
In this third cluster, we also include a measure of the complainant’s
level of democracy. The notion here is that more democratic complain-
ants may be more responsive to interest groups and may, therefore,
pursue different defendants. The data we use are from the Polity IV
Project data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2005) and tap the general open-
ness of domestic political institutions. The data set includes six com-
ponents: the extent to which a country has institutionalized procedures
regarding the transfer of executive power, the extent to which governing
executives are chosen through competitive elections, the extent of op-
portunities for nonelites to attain executive ofﬁce, the extent of opera-
tional (de facto) constraints on the chief executive, the development of
institutional structures for civil society’s political expression, and the
extent to which nonelites are able to access institutional structures for
political expression. These characteristics pick up the main components
of democratic governance. The scale runs from 10 (highly autocratic)
to 10 (highly open and democratic).
Finally, one additional variable is included that does not fall into any
of these clusters. We include a control for the presence of the Advisory
Centre on WTO Law. The Centre, established October 5, 2001,provides
legal advice, legal representation, and training to developing countries.
We create a dummy variable equal to one if the Centre was in existence
at the time of the dispute and the complaining state was eligible to use
its resources. It is equal to zero otherwise. The Centreattemptstoaddress
the capacity problems facing poor states, and it is included because it
may have affected the ability of developing states to pursue cases. Table
6 provides summary statistics for the key economic and explanatory
variables used in the analysis.5
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Table 6. Summary Statistics for Key Economic and Explanatory Variables
N Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Complainant gross domestic product
a 331 4.01e12 4.12e12 6.63e8 1.03e13
Complainant gross domestic product per capita
a 331 17,831 12,718 381 46,553
Complainant number of World Trade
Organization representatives 352 13.5 5.2 2 23
Complainant number of embassies 352 99.5 37.9 0 158
Complainant nonmilitary general
government expenditures
a 285 6.31e11 6.46e11 6.46e8 1.84e12
Bureaucratic quality 327 3.39 .87 1 4
Complainant military expenditures
a 289 1.09e11 1.15e11 1.16e8 3.09e11
Complainant imports from defendant
b 332 42,486 64,881 .22 251,598
Complainant exports to defendant
b 332 43,099 68,108 1.26 245,922
Complainant total exports
b 303 638,420 795,245 651 2,430,160
Complainant total imports
b 303 686,533 781,180 1,643 2,321,950
Defendant total imports
b 304 690,732 753,985 1,800 2,321,950
Defendant total exports
b 304 604,218 747,562 645 2,430,160
Past participation by complainant 352 .92 .27 0 1
a Constant 1995 U.S. dollars.
b Millions of U.S. dollars.DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 583
5. RESULTS
Table 7 presents ordinary least squares regression results testingthemain
hypotheses. The results offer strong support for the capacity hypothesis
and virtually no support for the power hypothesis.
The coefﬁcient on the GDP of the complainant is negative and highly
signiﬁcant (at the 1 percent level), which suggests that as a complainant’s
income falls, it tend to pursue wealthier defendants on average. This is
precisely what the capacity hypothesis predicts—poor states will have
limited resources, and these resources will be used strategically. Rich
states are willing to ﬁle complaints against a broad range of defendants,
whereas poor states are reluctant to ﬁle against other poor states. Con-
trolling for a variety of relevant factors, we ﬁnd that poor countries will
use the DSU to bring cases against countries that offer larger rather than
smaller markets for their products and, therefore, larger expected gains.
The power hypothesis predicts just the opposite result, of course. So the
coefﬁcient on GDP is the ﬁrst—and probably the most decisive—indi-
cator that the results are driven by the complainants’ capacity rather
than the fear of retribution.
Our results are consistent with the alternative interpretation that in-
creases in income cause states to pursue only poor defendants. One could
imagine, for example, that poor states tend to ﬁle complaints against
defendants without regard for the defendant’s income, but rich states
tend to ﬁle only against poor states. Although consistent withourresults,
we are unable to imagine a coherent theory under which poor states are
prepared to ﬁle complaints against rich states but all else equal rich
states are reluctant to do the same. Without a theoretical explanation
for such behavior, it is reasonable to interpret our results as providing
support for the capacity hypothesis.
In ﬁve of the six models presented, the complainant’s GDP is omitted.
Our various measures of power and capacity—GDP, number of WTO
representatives, number of embassies, nonmilitary expenditures,military
expenditures, bureaucratic quality, and GDP per capita tend to be cor-
related, as shown in Table 8. We use a variety of measures as a robustness
check, and, to that end, we include them one at a time in our regressions.
We have left GDP per capita in the reported regressions to control for
a complainant’s developmental level because this measure is likely to be
relevant for reasons other than capacity or power.
In models 2–5 we include our other proxies for capacity. In the ﬁrst
three of these models, our capacity measures are strongly negative and5
8
4
Table 7. Determinants of Defendant Selection
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Explanatory variables:
Complainant gross domestic product .424**
Complainant gross domestic product per capita .076 .196** .069 .182** .109*
Complainant number of World Trade
Organization representatives .077**
Complainant number of embassies .011**
Complainant nonmilitary expenditures .348**
Bureaucratic quality .137
Complainant military expenditures .376**
Past participation by complainant .293
 .416** .475** .283
 .464** .324*
Dyadic control variables:
Complainant imports from defendant .632** .516** .512*** .605** .458** .640**
Complainant expenditure to defendant over
complainant total expenditure .490 .295 .258 .429 .375 .565
Retaliation .096 .136 .081 .144 .107 .097
Preferential trading agreement .905** .818* .474 .898** .526 .895**
Case control variables:
Multiple complainants .279* .208 .273
 .121 .244 .208

Bandwagon .057 .062 .120 .129 .112 .146
Repeat ﬁling .355* .403* .305
 .411** .419* .409**
Antidumping .223 .156 .234 .166 .254 .2275
8
5
Agriculture .021 .064 .100 .011 .114 .004
GATS .397* .705** .475* .493** .564* .346*
GATT .236
 .179 .212 .314* .177 .296*
SPS .331* .321* .441** .326** .363** .319*
TRIPS .242
 .344
 .193 .304
 .348
 .201
World Trade Organization .318* .244 .248 .317** .264 .300*
Controls for complainant and defendant:
Complainant imports  exports over
complainant gross domestic product .555* .098 .538
 .364
 .113 .551*
Defendant imports  exports over defendant
gross domestic product 2.049** 2.118** 1.900** 1.897** 2.108** 1.731**
Complainant polity .039* .032
 .006 .004 .006 .015
European Community defendant 1.859** 2.334** 2.387** 1.852** 2.524** 1.720**
United States defendant 1.442** 1.982** 1.820** 1.542** 2.126** 1.374**
European Community versus United States .688** 1.127** 1.020** .736** 1.166** .572*
Advisory Centre .053 .057 .022 .063 .000 .007
N 303 303 303 285 296 289
R
2 .91 .90 .90 .91 .89 .91
Note. The dependent variable is the log of the defendant’s gross domestic product. GATS p General Agreement on Trade in Services; GATT p General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; SPS p Sanitary and Phylosanitary Measures; TRIPS p Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
 Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Table 8. Correlation Matrix for Capacity and Power Variables
Gross
Domestic
Product
Gross
Domestic
Product
per Capita
Number of
World Trade
Organization
Representatives
Number of
Embassies
Nonmilitary
Expenditures
Military
Expenditures
Bureaucratic
Quality
Gross domestic product 1.00
Gross domestic product
per capita .75 1.00
Number of World Trade
Organization representatives .81 .73 1.00
Number of embassies .65 .62 .52 1.00
Nonmilitary expenditures .95 .66 .81 .42 1.00
Military expenditures .93 .70 .65 .81 .78 1.00
Bureaucratic quality .66 .80 .54 .51 .61 .62 1.00DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 587
signiﬁcant, which indicates that countries with the capacity to do so
extend their litigation to include smaller defendants. The number of
WTO representatives, the number of embassies, and the level of non-
military government spending are all negative and signiﬁcant (at the 1
percent level), as predicted by the capacity hypothesis. This constitutes
reasonably consistent evidence in favorof the capacityhypothesis.Model
5, which includes bureaucratic quality as a capacity measure, yields a
negative coefﬁcient as predicted by the capacity hypothesis, but the co-
efﬁcient is not signiﬁcant. Notice that GDP per capita is negative and
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in this regression. Given the signiﬁcant
correlation between the bureaucratic quality measure and the GDP per
capita measure, it is not surprising that only one of them is signiﬁcant.
When the same regression is run without GDP per capita, bureaucratic
quality is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. As a result,
although this regression does not provide strongevidenceforthecapacity
hypothesis, we do not interpret it as being inconsistent with it either.
More support for the capacity hypothesis can be found in the strong
negative relationship between past participation and the GDP of the
target. The data indicate that states that have been party to one or more
WTO cases and that, therefore, are likely to have greater familiarity
with the system, tend to complain against less wealthy defendants. This
suggests that lower capacity (in this case, less experienced) states select
wealthier defendants. Once again, the power hypothesis would have led
us to expect the opposite, at least to the extent that participation in
WTO cases is a reasonable proxy for political power.
In model 6, we include military expenditures as a power variable. To
the extent this variable is correlated with the wealth of the country (see
Bown 2003), it could also be seen as a rough proxy for capacity. The
relevant coefﬁcient is negative and highly signiﬁcant. This contradicts
the power hypothesis and supports the capacity hypothesis.
It is interesting to note that the dummy for the Advisory Centre is
not signiﬁcant in any of our regressions. Coupled with the strong evi-
dence of the capacity hypothesis, it is tempting to interpret this result
as casting some doubt on the success of the Centre in relievingtheburden
on the capacity of poor states. This is not necessarily correct, however.
If the Centre has increased the ability of poor states to litigate, it may
have both caused some states to pursue defendants with lower GDPs
and prompted some states that would otherwise have been unable to do
so to ﬁle a complaint. That is, the Centre may bring resource-poorstates
into our data set by allowing them to pursue high-GDP defendants. This588 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
would tend to increase the size of the coefﬁcient. At the same time, the
Centre may allow states that would ﬁle against a large defendant re-
gardless to ﬁle also against smaller defendants with lower GDPs. This
would tend to reduce the size of the coefﬁcient. Both of these results
would represent success for the Centre, and the net effect on our dummy
variable’s coefﬁcient is ambiguous.
6. ROBUSTNESS
To check the robustness of our results, we ran a number of variations
on the speciﬁcations presented in Table 7. This section provides a sum-
mary of these robustness checks, some of which have already been men-
tioned. Our robustness checks are not reported because they all yield
results consistent with the results presented.
First, we changed the combinations of explanatory variables. For
example, we ran the regressions with the complainant’s GDP per capita
omitted, the net effect of which was to increase the magnitude of the
other capacity measures. We also ran versions of models 2–5 with GDP
included. These yielded highly signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcients on GDP,
much like in model 1, and coefﬁcients on the other capacity proxies
(number of WTO representatives, number of embassies, and nonmilitary
spending) that were negative as in the reported regressions but not sig-
niﬁcant. We interpret this as evidence that the GDP proxy swamps these
other proxies when they are combined.
We experimented with various combinations of country dummies
included and excluded. Omitting the United States and EC dummies did
not alter our basic results. We also included dummies for the ﬁve most
frequent complainant states, India, Brazil, Canada, United States, and
EC, without affecting the results.
To guard against the possibility that the results are driven by some
sort of change over time, we included a time trend as well as year
dummies, without signiﬁcant changes to our results. Neither the time
trend nor any of the year dummies were signiﬁcant in any of our re-
gressions.
We included the log of the value of the complainant’s exports to the
defendant in place of the complainant’s exports to the defendant divided
by total complainant exports without affecting the results. Thiswasdone
because it is plausible that the decision to litigate is triggered more byDEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 589
the absolute value of exports to a country than by the share of those
exports to total exports. Again, our results were not changed.
The reported results include robust standard errors with standard
errors clustered in country pairs. We ran the same regressions without
clustering, and the results were similar to those reported.
To ensure that individual WTO agreements were not driving the re-
sults, we included all agreements at issue in more than 20 disputes.These
additional dummies were almost never signiﬁcant in our regressions,and
all of the regressions that included these dummies generated results sim-
ilar to those reported.
To guard against the possibility that collinearity among our trade
variables are affecting the results, we ran the reported regressions with
the openness variables (total trade over GDP) omitted. The reported
results were unaffected by this change.
As a more general test of robustness and a protection against collin-
earity, we estimated a stripped-down version of the model, in which all
controls were removed, with the exception of the bilateral trade data.
The regression then included the variables identiﬁed in Table 7 as ex-
planatory variables and the two trade variables referred to as dyadic
control variables. Once again, the basic results reported in Table 7 were
evident in this regression.
37
One ﬁnal question relates to the issue of selection bias. Clearly, coun-
tries have self-selected when they decide to complain against the trade
policies of others; we are under no illusions that complainants in the
WTO system are randomly selected. Is the problem of selection bias
important, and is it likely to affect the claims we are making in this
paper? Although we cannot rule out such an effect, we think it is unlikely
to be problematic.
Notice that, to undermine our results, any selection effect must be
very speciﬁc. It would have to lead to a set of ﬁled cases in which low-
capacity states tend to pursue high-GDP defendants. So it would have
to be a tendency for low-capacity states to settle their cases prior to the
litigation phase at a disproportionate rate when the would-be defendant
is a low-GDP state, and it would require that no similar effect is present
with high-GDP states. Thus, for example, if low-capacity states simply
ﬁle fewer cases, without regard for who the defendant would be, our
37. The one exception was the coefﬁcient on the number of WTO representatives in
model 2. In the stripped-down regression, this coefﬁcient was signiﬁcant only at the 10
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results remain reliable. Similarly, if poor countries are less likely to be
defendants because the gains from winning a case against them are too
small to justify the cost, all potential complainants would face a similar
deterrent, and our results would not be affected. Another possibility is
that high-GDP defendants are especially attractive because the leaders
in the complainant state can somehow extract political gains by being
perceived as strong and fearless in taking on a powerful adversary. Once
again, one would expect such gains to be present for all potential com-
plainants, in which case our results would not be affected. Furthermore,
if for some reason leaders of poor states enjoy unusually large political
rents from taking on powerful defendants, one would expect this to have
an effect on the way in which cases settle or the way in which they are
decided. Speciﬁcally, if relatively poor states seek out rich defendants
for some political reason, one would expect the average quality of such
cases to be lower than cases in general or than cases between poor states.
It follows that in cases between poor complainants and rich defendants,
the rate of settlement would be higher or the percentage of cases won
by the complainant would be lower. Neither of these is present in the
data. Ultimately, although we must cannot prove the absence of a se-
lection effect that might inﬂuence our results, we are unable to imagine
how such an effect could come about and think it unlikely to be driving
our conclusions.
Because we observe the pattern of disputes conditional on the com-
plainant initiating a case at the WTO, there are some claims that we
are unable to make. In particular, we have not shown that a deﬁcit in
legal capacity explains the general reluctance of some countriestolaunch
cases in the ﬁrst place. It is possible, for example, that power plays a
large role in determining which cases are brought. It may be that po-
litically weak states simply bring fewer cases, reducing the total number
of cases brought by weak states without altering the mix of defendants.
To the extent that power is having this effect, our results indicate that
the reluctance to litigate applies to all potential defendants and not
simply the most powerful.
7. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Has the WTO succeeded in replacing politics with law in international
trade disputes? A look at the number of cases initiated and eventually
won by developing countries seems to suggest that they suffer no greatDEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 591
disadvantage and that in fact they have equal access to trade justice
under the enhanced dispute settlement mechanisms in place since 1995.
We have argued, however, that the number of cases launched ishardly
proof that developing countries are equally able to defend their interests
through legal forms of dispute settlement. In the absence of a clear sense
of how many cases developing countries “ought to” have initiated, we
really do not know if these ﬁled cases represent equal access or not.
The evidence presented here indicates, however,thatdevelopingcoun-
tries are using the DSU in a way that reﬂects their current incapacity to
launch effective legal cases against potential trade law violators. Much
of the difﬁculty, we have argued, is in the precomplaint phase, when a
lack of human and technical resources reduces the ability to detect and
develop a credible complaint. The capacity constraint is evident in the
indirect evidence of a highly constrained choice of defendants. When
the ability to effectively detect and prosecute violators is low, govern-
ments will pursue only the largest cases involving the most lucrative
markets. Surprisingly, limitations on a government’s capacity to litigate
seem to be more important than the fear of political or economic ret-
ribution. Controlling for many alternative explanations, we ﬁnd that
poorer complainants have tended to focus on the big targets, a strategy
that is consistent with a tight capacity constraint rather than a fear of
retaliation.
The capacity hypothesis is supported by a range of indicators, none
of which we would say is perfect, but which taken together present a
fairly coherent picture. Whether measured by GDP, GDP per capita,
speciﬁc WTO staff resources, general diplomatic resources, domestic
ﬁnancial resources, or past participation in WTO disputes, we ﬁnd that
having meager means results in highly targeted complaints aimed at the
largest markets.
In some sense, our results are encouraging for developing countries.
After all, these countries are going after the targets that matter most for
their immediate trade interests. Some might even interpret our results
as evidence that the weaker countries are in fact free riding on the broad
trade law enforcement efforts of the wealthier governments. By this
interpretation, the wealthiest governments may be supporting the public
good of enforcing trade liberalization against a broad range of potential
violators, even if the size of the market to which they seek access in a
particular case is not especially large. Moreover, because accessing
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complainants, our results suggest the former beneﬁt as potential defen-
dants by the capacity constraints of other developing countries.
These conclusions are tempting, but capacity constraints also imply
the inability to achieve longer-term goals by making it difﬁcult to pursue
cases for their value as a precedent or their value in reputation building.
Our ﬁndings suggest that these constraints relegate developing countries
to tactical rather than strategic players in the international trade regime.
Their necessary obsession with immediate net gains means they will
likely be regime takers rather than regime makers for the foreseeable
future.
If our results unveil new evidence of inequality between small players
and major powers at the WTO, the good news is that the main problem
does not appear to be the threat of coercive tactics by the powerful. If
the problem is a deﬁcit in the ability to initiate legal action, there are
measures the international community can take to address this situation.
The Doha Round of WTO talks has been labeled the “Development
Round.” If this is to represent more than simply good marketing, WTO
members might usefully turn their attention to matters of development
with greater commitment than we have seen in the past. With respect
to dispute resolution, this means giving developing countries the best
possible access to the DSU, including assistance in the precomplaint
phase. We view the WTO’s Advisory Centre as a positive step and ac-
knowledge that the ability to use private counsel in WTO proceedings,
established in the EC Bananas case, is crucial (WT/DS/105 [October 29,
1999]). Increased funding and support for the Advisory Centre as well
as continued efforts to train government ofﬁcials from all countries in
WTO law would further assist developing countries.
With respect to prelitigation capacity issues, solutions are more dif-
ﬁcult to identify. Certainly the training of ofﬁcials in relevant law and
the greatest possible transparency in import measures are helpful but
seem insufﬁcient to give developing countries the maximum beneﬁt of
the DSU. Increased assistance (both ﬁnancial and technical) to devel-
oping countries is needed. The WTO itself, although it has understand-
ably been reluctant to act as a development organization, could provide
expertise akin to the Advisory Centre, which is intended to assist coun-
tries in establishing appropriate monitoring schemes and evaluating po-
tentially violative foreignpractices. Developingcountriesthemselvesmay
be able to make some progress by pooling resources in the monitoring
of trade practices, especially by countries with similar export portfolios.
Before jumping to conclusions about appropriate policy remedies,DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 593
however, further research is needed to conﬁrm and understand theextent
of the capacity constraint examined here. We would welcome more di-
verse measures of a state’s capacity to use the DSU, such as the size and
budget of the trade ministry, and indicators of the quality of personnel
(type and quality of training). Case studies on how highly constrained
complainants actually select their defendants would provide interesting
contextual evidence. Testing for the effect of alliances (security depen-
dence) and aid or special trade preferences (developmental dependence)
would be a good way to further explore the possibility for power to
inﬂuence the selection of defendants. At this early stage in the research
program, however, it would appear essential to take seriously the idea
that limitations on the ability to pursue a case, rather than the fear of
retaliation, are a major reason for the litigation patterns we see.594 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
APPENDIX A: COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION
Table A1. World Trade Organization Member Countries, by Income Level
High Upper Middle Lower Middle Low
Australia Antigua and Barbuda Brazil Bangladesh
Belgium Argentina China India
Canada Chile Columbia Nicaragua
Chinese Taipei Costa Rica Dominican Republic Pakistan
Denmark Croatia Ecuador
European Community Czech Republic Egypt
France Hungary Guatemala
Greece Malaysia Honduras
Hong Kong Mexico Indonesia
a
Ireland Panama Peru
Japan Poland Philippines
Korea Slovak Republic Romania
Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago South Africa
New Zealand Uruguay Sri Lanka
Norway Venezuela Thailand
Portugal Turkey
Singapore
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Note. Classiﬁcations are as of July 2004 and are from World Bank 2005b.
a Indonesia is classiﬁed as lower middle income from 1995–97 and lower income from
1998–2002.
APPENDIX B: DATA DESCRIPTIONS AND SOURCES
B1. Dependent Variable: Log of Defendant’s Gross Domestic Product
The log of the defendant’s 1995 GDP in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. The
GDP data are from World Bank, WDI Online (http://devdata.worldbank.org/
dataonline).
B2. Explanatory Variables
Log of Complainant’s Gross Domestic Product. The log of the complainant’s 1995
GDP in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. The GDP data are from World Bank, WDI
Online (http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline).
Log of Complainant’s Gross Domestic Product per Capita. The log of the complain-
ant’s 1995 per capita GDP in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. Per capita GDP data
are from World Bank, WDI Online (http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline).DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 595
Number of Embassies Worldwide. The total number of embassies worldwide main-
tained by each country in mid-2000. Data are from Tagish, Embassies World
Wide (http://www2.tagish.co.uk/Links/embassy1b.nsf/). Because no listings for
the EC are included in this data set, we averaged the number of worldwide
embassies of the EC’s member states to obtain a reasonable estimate of the EC’s
worldwide diplomatic force.
Log of Nonmilitary Government Expenditure over Gross Domestic Product. Log of non-
military government expenditure/GDP was calculated by subtracting military
expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) from total government expenditure (as a
percentage of GDP), then multiplying by GDP, dividing by 100, and taking the
log. Data for government expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) and military
expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) are from World Bank, WDI Online (http://
devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline).
Bureaucratic Quality. Data are spread on a scale of 1 to 6 and measure the
extent to which a country’s bureaucracy is capable of carrying out a range of
administrative tasks. The bureaucratic quality measurements for a given country
is ﬁxed throughout the 10-year period as we have no reason to believe that there
have been dramatic changes in the variable over the WTO’s history. For a full
discussion of the conceptualization of the bureaucratic quality measure, see
Knack and Keefer (1995). Data are from Knack and Keefer (1998).
Past Participation in the Dispute Settlement Understanding Process. If a country has
previously participated in the DSU process as either a complainant or a defen-
dant, then the dummy variable receives a value of one and a value of zero
otherwise. Data are from World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: The
Disputes (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm).
Log of the Complainant’s Military Expenditure. Complainants’ military expenditure
data are from World Bank, WDI Online (http://devdata.worldbank.org/
dataonline).
B3. Control Variables
Dyadic Controls
Imports to Complainant from Defendant. Complainant’s imports from defendant,
measured in current U.S. dollars. Data are from International Monetary Fund
(2003). Data for bilateral trade with Taiwan are from Bureau of Foreign Trade
(http://eweb.trade.gov.tw/eng2002/kmDoit.asp?CAT46&CtNodep643).
Exports from Complainant to Defendant over Complainant’s Total Exports. Complain-
ant’s exports to defendant divided by complainant’s total exports, measured in
current U.S. dollars. Data are from the 2003 IMF DOTS Database. Data for596 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (2) / JUNE 2005
bilateral trade with Taiwan are from Bureau of Foreign Trade (http://
eweb.trade.gov.tw/eng2002/kmDoit.asp?CAT46&CtNodep643).
Retaliation. Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the defendant has
ﬁled against the complainant within the last year.
Preferential Trading Agreement. Dummy variable that takes on the value of one
if the countries in the case in question were involved, at the time of the dispute,
in a PTA. To determine if a PTA was in force between the countries at the time
of the dispute, we consulted WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Notiﬁed to
the GATT/WTO and in Force (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/
region_e.htm). Agreements identiﬁed as free-trade agreements or customs unions
are considered PTAs for our purposes. Agreements identiﬁed as preferential arrange-
ments were not counted as PTAs.
Case Controls
Multiple Complainants. Dummy variable that takes on the value of one when the
complainant in the dispute is one of several complainants in the case before the
WTO.
Bandwagon. Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the case in ques-
tion features the same defendant and same issue as a previous case but a different
complainant.
Repeat Filing. Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the case in
question is a reﬁled case, by which we mean there has been an earlier request
for consultations between the same parties on the same issues (or perhaps a
subset thereof) that was not resolved. We assign the value of one to the dummy
in the reﬁled case and not in the original case because it is only in the latter
case that one would expect changes in the consequences of a complaint. Data
are from World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: The Disputes (http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm).
World Trade Organization Agreements. Series of dummy variables that take on the
value of one when the relevant agreement is part of the dispute.
Controls for Complainant and Defendant
Log of Total Trade over Gross Domestic Product. The log of the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP. Data are from World
Bank, WDI Online (http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline).
United States as Defendant. Dummy variable that takes on the value of one when
the United States is the defendant in the case in question.
European Community as Defendant. Dummy variable that takes on the value of
one when the EC is the defendant in the case in question.DEFENDANTS IN WTO DISPUTES / 597
United States versus European Community. Dummy variable that takes on the value
of one when the United States brings suit against the EC or vice versa.
Complainant’s Level of Democracy. Data are from the Polity IV Project data set
and tap the general openness of domestic political institutions. The scale runs
from 10 (highly autocratic) to 10 (highly open and democratic). Data are from
the Polity IV Project online database (Marshall and Jaggers 2005).
Advisory Centre. Dummy variable takes on the value of one if the WTO Ad-
visory Centre was in existence at the time of the dispute in question and the
complaining state was eligible to use the resources of the Centre. The Centre
was established on October 5, 2001, and the conditions of eligibility can be
found at Advisory Centre on WTO Law, Legal Advice (http://www.acwl.ch/e/
members/members_e.aspx).
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